West Brom Vs Norwich

West Brom Vs Norwich: The ultimate game of two halves.

Score: 2 - 1

Possession (%): 48 - 52

xG: 2.00 – 0.61

· Promising first half build-up variations and effective transitions.

· Norwich’s ball-orientated press.

· Bizarre substitutions.

· A familiar second half.

Base Formations:

Norwich started the game with a balanced eleven consisting of three natural midfielders and two naturally inverting wingers with Christos Tzolis and Marquinhos coming into the side. The inclusion of Sam Byram allowed Sorenson to move into his favoured midfield role. Both sides were set up in 4-2-3-1 base formations.

In the first phase of Norwich’s build-up, the away side typically transitioned into their usual 2-4-1-3 shape with Sorenson and Sara acting as a double pivot ahead of Byram and Omabamidele. Liam Gibbs occupied the number ten role behind Josh Sargent.

The hosts created a flexible 4-4-2 shape in the first pressing phase as John Swift (19) joined Thomas-Asante (21) to create a front two. Jayson Molumby (14) stayed tight to Sara, but Okay Yokuslu (35) was often caught between tracking Sorenson and marking Gibbs. Townsend (3) and Furlong (2) were tasked with tracking Marquinhos and Tzolis, respectively.

But Norwich often transitioned into an alternative build-up shape when Sorenson dropped into the backline. This rotation allowed Byram to move wider while Giannoulis was free to move higher on the left wing; these rotations created a 2-3-4-1 shape with Sara becoming the single pivot.

Using this build-up variation, Norwich were able to manipulate West Brom’s press. With Giannoulis advancing on the left and Tzolis inverting, Furlong (2) now had to track Giannoulis. Norwich’s Greek left back frequently dropped to draw Furlong (2) into a high press. As a result, if the visitors were able to progress the ball quickly, they created a 4v3 overload in the attacking third.

Typically, in the second phase of Norwich’s build-up, David Wagner’s men created a 3-3-3-1 shape as Sorenson dropped into a back three with Omabamidele and Byram. Giannoulis and Aarons occupied the wide areas, while Tzolis and Marquinhos inverted to occupy the half spaces. Carlos Corberan’s side tended to drop into a 4-4-2 mid-block with the wingers pressing from the front and the full backs jumping on Aarons and Giannoulis.

The 3-1 build-up structure – created by the 3-3-3-1 shape – often left Gabriel Sara isolated in midfield. But in the first half, Norwich did well to support the Brazilian through two primary rotations. The first and most common rotation saw Liam Gibbs drop into midfield; this allowed Norwich to occupy better spaces centrally by creating a 3-2 build-up structure.

Another rotation, albeit more of a rare occurrence, saw Max Aarons invert from right back to create a similar 3-2 build-up shape. This rotation allowed Gibbs to remain between the lines while Marquinhos occupied the wide corridor.

Both second phase build-up variations created a 3-2-4-1 structure in possession. This shape aided ball progression and created a more secure 3-2 rest defence to cope with defensive transitions. Against West Brom’s 4-4-2 pressing structure, Norwich’s temporary 3-2-4-1 created problems for the hosts.

Norwich had a 3v2 against the first line of pressure, which encouraged West Brom’s ball side winger to jump to support the front two. Norwich’s double pivot drew Molumby (14) and Yokuslu (35) into a press, leaving the half spaces free for Tzolis, Marquinhos or Gibbs. David Wagner’s men also had a 5v4 against West Brom’s last line of pressure. The 3-2-4-1, therefore, gave Norwich clear structural superiority.

West Brom built-up in a similar shape to Wagner’s side in the first phase, with the hosts transitioning into a 2-4-3-1 shape with a double pivot. Norwich pressed in their usual 4-1-3-2 ball-orientated structure. The narrow midfield trio of Tzolis, Sara, and Marquinhos limited West Brom’s double pivot but often left their full backs free.

With Aarons and Giannoulis pinned back by Grant (18) and Wallace (17), respectively, they were often unable to jump to join the press. So, Norwich shifted across to whichever full back received the ball, attempting to trap them against the touchline.

But Wallace (17), Swift (19), and Grant (18) frequently dropped to provide passing options beyond Norwich’s second line of pressure. Sorenson did well to track whichever West Brom attacking midfielder dropped, but Aarons and Giannoulis were often slow to help him.

In the second half, Norwich’s sluggish 3-1-1-5 shape of previous weeks began to reappear. While at times Sara was isolated in the first half, Norwich’s movement meant he often had support. In the second half, however, David Wagner’s men were failing to support him, and the attacking five were far too slow to track back.

Norwich’s suboptimal occupation of space made ball progression challenging and left Norwich vulnerable during defensive transitions. As Wagner himself admitted, Norwich totally lost their structure in the second half.

But recognising a structural issue and fixing it are two very different tasks. David Wagner’s solution to Norwich’s poor structure was to make four personnel changes. Gibbs, Tzolis, and Sorenson were all replaced despite their impressive first half performances, while Marquinhos also made way for Pukki, Idah, Rowe, and Hayden.

The profiles of the players Wagner added to the game in the second half did not suit an improved structure. Instead, they suited the same 3-1-1-5 structure, which had already become problematic. The balance of the starting eleven was reversed once these personnel changes were made.

Norwich fans can take at least some encouragement from the first half display against West Brom; there were signs of improvement in Norwich’s structure, and there were numerous spells in which Norwich showed potential in attacking transitions.

The temporary rotations that created an improved 3-2-4-1 shape gave Norwich clear positional and structural superiority in possession. But these developments were mere variations of a more constant 3-1 build-up structure.

Norwich’s multifaceted first half build-up became passive and predictable in the second half; there was no longer a clear method of vertical ball progression. Not only was the structure weak, but players began to make increasingly poor decisions in possession.

It is hard to summarise Saturday’s defeat without reference to a certain overused cliché; a promising first half was followed by a second half that epitomised the final months of Norwich’s season. Tactically, it was the ultimate ‘game of two halves’.