Flat and Flaws
Score: 1 – 1
Possession (%): 62 – 38
xG: Not available
• Incomplete build-up patterns.
• Bristol’s press and advantages in possession.
• Aimlessness in settled possession.
• Norwich’s pressing flaws.
Base Formations:
Favouring game-time for Norwich’s older squad members at the expense of opportunities for academy prospects, David Wagner selected a starting eleven with an average age of over 28 in the third round of the FA Cup on Saturday.
Josh Sargent made his first start since August, while Liam Gibbs received a rare opportunity in his preferred position at the base of Norwich’s midfield.
The hosts set up in a fluid 4-2-3-1 shape, with Ashley Barnes performing the second striker role. Having already beaten Wagner’s Norwich this season with Rotherham, Matt Taylor set his Bristol Rovers side up in a 3-5-2 base formation.
In their deep build-up phases, Norwich transitioned into their usual 4-2-4 shape with two deep-lying forwards, creating more of a 4-2-2-2 structure. Bristol Rovers initially pressed in a 3-1-4-2 shape, with Sam Finley (6) sitting behind the first two lines of pressure.
The visitors pressed with intensity in the first two lines, while Finley (6) tracked the ball-side deep-lying forward. Sargent (9) and Barnes (10) often switched sides, but the duo frequently created a problem for Rovers in their third pressing line.
In the first ten minutes, a pass from Long (12) to his left initiated the visitor’s press. With Sargent (9) dropping into his own half, he gave Finley (6) too far to jump, ensuring Norwich benefitted from their 2v1 advantage in the third line.
Norwich were able to exploit the same weakness on their right side when Long (12) played out to Danny Batth (21). Jevani Brown (20) pressed Batth (21), leaving Vale (19) to jump onto Fisher (35). Grant Ward (8) initially tracked Gibbs (8), leaving Finley (6) responsible for Sargent (9) in the third pressing line.
Norwich’s deep build-up strategy can be split into two key elements: slow provocation and fast artificial transitions. The provocation aspect involves reducing the speed of play, often to a complete standstill, to entice an opponent to press.
Once pressure is successfully baited, and players become free behind pressing lines, the fast aspect can begin. In these moments, the nature of ball progression replicates transitions without real turnovers – they’re ‘artificial’ transitions.
Despite Norwich’s success in the initial build-up phases, with the hosts frequently able to access Sargent (9) behind the first two lines of pressure, Wagner’s men lacked the fast element of press-baiting build-up play. As a result, the visitors had time to drop into their 5-3-2 mid-block.
To make matters worse for Wagner’s side, a slight adjustment to the visitor’s press removed Norwich’s third-line overload. Having initially occupied Gibbs (8) in the second pressing line, Ward (8) dropped back towards Sargent (9) to block Norwich’s most common escape route.
This positional adjustment meant Rovers prevented Norwich’s third line advantage but conceded a new 2v1 in the line behind the strikers, as Gibbs (8) and Forshaw (29) overloaded Evans (21).
But this numerical advantage was less dangerous than the initial overload. Instead of allowing Norwich to play to Sargent (9) through two lines of pressure, Matt Taylor’s side were able to limit ball progression beyond City’s double pivot.
Norwich failed to create an alternative escape route and were either confined to the edge of their box, or George Long (12) would attempt a more direct approach. The combination of Bristol’s pressing adjustment and Norwich’s failure to find solutions meant City had a lot of possession in their own half.
One of the host’s pivots often dropped between the centre-backs early in build-up phases to create a situational back three. This created a temporary 3-3-4 shape with very few players in areas to facilitate central progression.
City’s first-half goal, however, provided an example of two issues with Bristol Rovers’ structure between phases out of possession. While transitioning from their 3-1-4-2 to a 5-3-2, the visitors allowed Norwich’s pivots too much time to target the space behind the wing-backs.
In the latter phases of settled possession, Norwich created their usual structure against teams with a back five, as City’s wingers occupied the space on either side of the visitor’s defensive block.
But Norwich’s patterns in these phases were overly predictable andbasic, they lacked any real penetration. Wagner’s men either targeted the full-backs with long diagonals or they shifted possession from side to side via the wingers.
Without playing out from goal-kicks, much of Rovers’ build-up play began on the edge of their half, where Matt Taylor’s side created a 3-1-4-2 shape. In high pressing phases, Norwich transitioned into a 4-1-3-2 structure before creating their usual ball-side man-to-man press.
On City’s left, for example, the front two pressed the ball-side centre-backs, while Gibbs (8) jumped onto Finley (6), Hernandez (25) tracked Ward (8), and Forshaw (29) occupied Evans (21).
On occasion, however, Hernandez (25) was drawn to press the far-side centre-back, thus exposing Forshaw (29) in a 2v1 against Ward (8) and Evans (21). As a result, the visitors were able to play through Norwich’s high press.
When Rovers advanced to the edge of Norwich’s half and the hosts transitioned into a 4-4-2 mid-block, yet another pressing flaw was exposed. With Evans (21) alongside Ward (8), and Norwich’s front two pressing from the front, City’s midfield duo jumped to press simultaneously.
This left Vale (19) free to receive in the left half space after the left wing-back temporarily switched with Ward (8). This pattern finished with Brown (20) missing a great chance to take the lead.
In the second half, Bristol Rovers missed another chance after creating further positional advantages in midfield. With Norwich pressing from a 4-4-2 mid-block, Evans (21) was free to receive from Crama (25).
After the Rovers’ midfielder resisted challenges from Gibbs (8) and Sainz (7), he was able to find Thomas (11) who – with Forshaw (29) late to press – bounced the ball back to Finley (6). The number six then had time to exploit the space behind Hanley (5) with a through ball into the right half space.
Post-match, David Wagner explained that everyone – including the players – needed to take responsibility for mistakes. But this contest, against a League One opponent, raised yet more questions about the coaching of this Norwich side.
Moments undoubtedly decide games. But, as I often explain, processes create moments.
Let’s take Kellen Fisher’s mistake, for example. Just moments before Fisher (35) passed straight to the goal-scorer, Norwich allowed a 5v4 last-line overload, leaving Fisher (35) isolated in a 2v1. This is just one example of flawed tactical processes creating crucial moments.
Ultimately, Norwich lacked ideas in possession, and there were notable flaws in phases without the ball. This has developed into a common theme for Wagner’s side. They frequently rely on benefitting from transitions created by opposition mistakes, and they often require moments of individual quality.
Unfortunately, that isn’t sustainable long-term, and blaming individual errors is misguided and unhelpful.