Man City Vs Fluminense

Score: 4 – 0

In Man City’s deep build-up phases, Ruben Dias (3) often dropped alongside Ederson (31), while Stones (5) created a double pivot with Rodri (16). Walker (2) and Ake (6) provided the width on the right and left, respectively.

Rico Lewis (82) and Phil Foden (47) occupied the half spaces ahead of City’s double pivot, leaving Grealish (10), Bernado Silva (20), and Alvarez (19) in the last line. In response, Fluminense pressed aggressively with man-orientation. Ganso (10) joined Cano (14) in the first line of pressure.

But the dynamics of the Fluminense press were more significant than the emergent structure. With City typically beginning their build-up with a pass from Ederson (31), Cano (14) jumped from Stones (5) to Dias (3) as he received the first pass. This was a trigger for Martinelli (8) to press Stones (5).

A pass back to Ederson (31) initiated a similar sequence, as Andre (8) jumped onto Rodri (16) when Ganso (10) pressed from the front. On Fluminense’s right wing, Arias (21) performed a hybrid role between Foden (47) and Ake (6). While, on their left, Keno (11) stayed closer to Walker (2), forcing Melo (30) to jump onto Lewis (82) from the last line.

Despite their aggression, Fluminense were occasionally late to execute these initial jumps. It was, therefore, crucial for the Brazilian side to press Lewis (82) and Foden (47) as soon as they received an out-ball. Felipe Melo’s (30) aggressive role often restricted Lewis (82) on the left, while the hybrid roles of Andre (7) and Arias (21) were an attempt to do the same with Foden (47) and Ake (6).

In settled phases of possession, beyond City’s deep build-up, Guardiola’s side transitioned into a 3-2-2-3 structure. Ake (6) and Walker (2) became hybrid centre-backs, while Stones (5) remained alongside Rodri (16) in a double pivot. In true positional fashion, each of the five vertical corridors were occupied.

Fernando Diniz’s side created a 4-4-2 in these moments, with Keno (11) and Arias (21) ready to press City’s wide centre-backs, while Cano (14) and Ganso (10) stayed tight to the double pivot.

Within the first thirty minutes, there was a perfect example of the pre-planned patterns associated with positionism. Guardiola’s side attempted to manipulate Fluminense’s coordinated jumps by progressing through temporarily free players.

For example, once Cano (14) pressed Dias (3) and Keno (11) pressed Walker (2), City were able to access Bernado Silva (20) via the briefly unoccupied John Stones (5). With Martinelli (8) jumping from Rico Lewis (82) to Stones (5), Bernado Silva (20) played a pass back infield towards Lewis (82).

Such patterns of progression enabled Man City to force Fluminense back, where they could exploit the gaps created by City’s width. With Diniz’s side remaining in a 4-4-2, Lewis (82) and Foden (47) were often free in the half spaces, as Marcelo (12) and Samuel Xavier (2) were drawn to Bernado Silva (20) and Grealish (10) in the wide areas.

This was a common issue for Fluminense, with City frequently exploiting their 5v4 last-line advantage. In deeper phases out of possession, however, the Libertadores champions dropped into a 5-4-1, thereby limiting space between the full-backs and centre-backs.

Arias (21) created the back five by dropping alongside Samuel Xavier (2), as the forward on the right dropped into a midfield four. Diniz’s men would then spring out into their original 4-4-2 to force City back.

Thus far, we’ve analysed Fluminense out of possession through an ostensibly structural lens. This is, however, more reflective of the heavily positional opponent they faced rather than of their own preferred means of organisation.

With the Brazilian club in possession, the nature of this analysis must change in line with the divergence in tactical approach. In truth, some aspects of Fluminense’s collective coherence can’t be reflected by mere static visualisations. But that doesn’t render all analysis futile.

In their deepest build-up phases, Nino (33) and Melo (30) dropped alongside Fabio (1), while Andre (7) and occasionally Martinelli (8) dropped into the Fluminense box to receive from deep. Keno (11), Ganso (10), and Arias (21) were deep in their own half, shifting across to the ball-side to combine with teammates.

Guardiola’s side pressed from a 4-2-4 base, with Grealish (10), Foden (47), and Bernado Silva (20) joining Alvarez (19) in the front line. Lewis (82) and Rodri (16) stayed close to Ganso (10) and the Fluminense wingers (11 and 21). Kyle Walker (2) and Nathan Ake (6) were tasked with jumping onto Marcelo (12) and Samuel Xavier (2) from deep.

Fluminense’s highly changeable build-up play often drew City to one corner, where five Fluminense players would often occupy the space between the edge of the box and the touchline. It was in these situations that Diniz’s side demonstrated their fluid, and somewhat chaotic, combination play.

There was, however, a significant far-side defensive weakness exposed within the first minute when a mistake from Marcelo (12) during an extreme left-side Fluminense tilt allowed Ake (6) space and time to shoot unchallenged. Alvarez (19) moved into the perfect position to score from the rebound following Ake’s (6) shot.

At this point, it would make sense to address two common critiques provided by some tactical analysts. The first is the view that ‘relational teams don’t have a rest defence’; the second is that ‘relational build-up play is flawed given the lack of players in advanced positions following any successful build-up’.

The first point perpetrates the damaging hegemony Juan Manuel Lillo has sought to challenge. It is to say that, if a rest defence – the defensive structure created in possession to prepare for defensive transitions – isn’t structurally organised in the positional sense, we don’t recognise it as a true rest defence. This view is reductive. Alternative organisational logic can exist beyond our existing apprehension.

For Fluminense, the proximity of players on the ball-side provides their rest defence. If possession is lost, relational teams typically have players in optimal positions to counter-press against the touchline. We can have an important debate about the efficacy of this as a rest defence, especially given the significant far-side weakness it creates, but denying the existence of any alternative to positional structures isn’t a beneficial line of attack.

The second point misunderstands the intention of relational build-up play. Overloading the space around the ball is used a means of maximising combination play. Positional teams leave players in attacking areas to generate immediate chances if ball progression occurs. Relational teams, on the other hand, commit more players to deep build-up phases with the primary aim of progressing into periods of settled possession.

Given the highly changeable positions of Fluminense’s players in possession, it would be impossible to sufficiently represent every significant dynamic or interpersonal connection within a few static visualisations. But these graphics can be used to introduce the types of combination play we see from relational teams.

When advancing into periods of settled possession, Fluminense continued to tilt towards the touchlines to create ball-side overloads against City. During left field-tilts, Arias (21) moved over to join Keno (11) – on paper, his opposite winger. Samuel Xavier (2) created the defensive diagonal, while the remaining players combined in close proximity.

Ganso (10) often created ‘tabelas’ (tables) with Marcelo (12), Andre (7), Martinelli (8), and the wingers (11 and 21). Ganso (10) was one of Fluminense’s primary playmakers, with the number ten frequently dropping to ‘toco y me voy’ (I touch and I go) with teammates.

Within the first ten minutes, in one of Fluminense’s right field-tilts, Melo (30) created the defensive diagonal while Marcelo (12) stayed wider on the left. The wingers (11 and 21) shifted over to the right, while Ganso (10) and Andre (7) dropped to the base of an ‘escadinha’ (staircase or ladder) – used by relational teams as a means of vertical ball progression – created between Martinelli (8), Arias (21), Samuel Xavier (2), and Keno (11).

With Marcelo (12) staying wider on the left, Fluminense were able to temporarily reduce the pressure on the ball-side by playing across to the former Real Madrid left-back to perform ‘the yo-yo’. The yo-yo involves moving away from the side of the overload via the defensive diagonal, before shifting the ball back to the side of the original tilt.

Overloading one side can also be used as a means of isolating players on the far-side in 1v1s. When Fluminense were struggling to break City down on the side of the overload, they occasionally shifted over to attack on the far-side instead of performing the yo-yo.

The result of the 2023 Club World Cup final was, undoubtedly, convincing for Guardiola’s City. Given the financial disparity between the two clubs, it was always going to be a tough test for Fluminense. But it was a final between two clubs with inherently different tactical ideas; for that reason, it cannot be dismissed as an insignificant contest.

There was more knowledge to gain from this final than from the majority of games we typically watch. It’s rare to see such a significant clash of ideas and cultures in a single game: positionism dominates much of Europe and beyond. That is, in part, due to the success of positional coaches like Guardiola. But there’s more to football than just positionism, and Manchester City versus Fluminense was evidence of that.

The introduction of relational ideas in this article were inspired by the work of Jamie Hamilton. Find his work here: https://medium.com/@stirlingj1982.