An Insomniac’s Dream
Score: 1 – 1
Possession (%): 25 – 75
Passes: 261 – 782
Shots: 7 – 21
xG: 0.83 – 2.50
• Back five rationale and dynamics.
• Southampton’s fluid progression.
• Norwich’s inefficacy in possession.
• Russell Martin’s second-half changes.
Base Formations:
On Russell Martin’s return to Carrow Road, his Southampton side set up in a fluid 4-3-3 shape. On some formation graphics, the Saints appeared to set up with a back three, but the visitor’s average positions were distorted by second-half changes.
Martin admitted he was surprised by Norwich’s change in shape, as David Wagner’s side abandoned their usual setup for a 5-4-1.
Given Southampton’s dominance, it would make sense to begin by analysing the Saints in possession while breaking down the rationale and practical application of Norwich’s new shape.
Aside from the occasional Saints goal kick, Norwich rarely pressed Southampton in their deep build-up phases. Instead, Wagner’s men allowed the visitors to advance into periods of settled possession, preferring to drop back into their 5-4-1 than commit men forward.
In these settled phases, with Southampton in possession, Martin’s side created a fluid 4-1-5 shape – which became a 2-3-5 in Norwich's half – with two narrow full-backs. Kyle Walker-Peters (2) started further forward than his usual full-back position, occupying space high and wide on the right.
By staying relatively narrow, Manning (3) and Stephens (5) ensured the visitors minimised Norwich counter-attacks. When play shifted over to one touchline in Norwich’s half, the Saints’ 2-3 rest defence moved over to the same side.
These dynamics allowed the visitors to sustain pressure while stretching Norwich in the last line. The narrow positioning of the full-backs also meant Martin’s side could access players on the far side quickly.
When analysing Southampton’s settled-play structure, it becomes clear that Martin’s side attack with players occupying each of the five vertical corridors. This is a common idea associated with positional play. Such a setup seeks to profit from last-line overloads against defensive structures with a back four.
Setting up with a back five makes it more difficult for this approach to generate overloads in the half spaces or out wide. Indeed, Norwich’s setup ensured each of Southampton’s attacking five were occupied.
The challenge for Southampton then became about finding dynamic methods to create overloads without an initial advantage in the last line. The narrow full-backs played a key role in this endeavour, with the duo frequently joining attacks on both sides.
In the forty-second minute, for example, Stephens (5) moved into the box before receiving from Adam Armstrong (9) and striking the woodwork in front of The Barclay.
Stuart Armstrong (17) and Aribo (7) often rotated with the wide players to dissociate markers. The duo also frequently dropped outside of Norwich’s defensive block to receive from the centre-backs before moving back inside after playing the ball out wide.
Just after Ryan Fraser (26) had replaced Edozie (23), the visitors created a pattern combining some of the elements we’re exploring. After shifting the ball out to Manning (3), the visitors returned to the far side via Stephens (5), who played to Aribo (7) as he dropped outside of Norwich’s block.
Having moved away from McLean (23) and Sainz (7) to receive the pass, Aribo (7) played wide to Walker-Peters (2) before underlapping to receive a return pass in the half space. With McLean (23) still shifting over to the left, he was late to engage Aribo (7), allowing him time to play back to Walker-Peters (2) in the box.
Despite the change in shape, Norwich created a very similar deep build-up structure to their usual 4-2-4. Hanley (5) moved out to Stacey’s (3) usual position, while the latter advanced to become a situational right winger. Rowe (27) and Sainz (7) dropped to occupy the deep-lying forward roles, with Hwang (31) moving over to the left wing.
Unlike their hosts, Russell Martin’s Southampton pressed aggressively from a 4-3-3 base. With Harwood-Bellis (21) tracking Hwang (31), Stephens (5) was free to jump onto Sainz (7). The Saints’ pressing players had hybrid roles, with their movement depending on Gunn’s (23) first pass.
When Gunn (28) played out to his left, Walker-Peters (2) pressed McLean (23) to begin an aggressive ball-side man-to-man press. Edozie (23) pressed Gunn (23) to prevent Norwich from playing back to their right, while Armstrong (9) tracked Sara (17).
In response, Norwich often resorted to going long towards Hwang (31) – an approach with a minimal chance of ball retention given their numerical disadvantage in the last line.
Following a pass from Gunn (23) to his right, the Saints’ created a similar press, but Downes (4) jumped onto Rowe (27) or the ball-side pivot. In the last line, Manning (3) stayed with Stacey (3), while Bednarek (35) followed Rowe (27) when Downes (4) pressed Nunez (26).
In the second half, Russell Martin was forced to make some adjustments following Bednarek’s (35) illness-related half-time departure. Che Adams (10) became the main striker as Armstrong (9) moved out to the right wing. Walker-Peters (2) moved back to right-back, and Stephens (5) became the left centre-back.
The visitor’s strategy out of possession also changed slightly in the second half, with the Saints’ creating an equally intense but more basic man-to-man press, leaving just Gunn (23) free.
One of Norwich’s only successful deep build-up moments came early in the second half when Downes (4) was baited to press Gunn (23) after following a bounce pass from Sara (17). This mistake meant Sara (17) was free to receive a pass from McCallum (15).
With twenty minutes remaining, Southampton took the lead through Adam Armstrong (9). It was a goal highlighting some of the limitations of Norwich’s approach. The chance started with Gunn (23) going long to Rowe (27) instead of playing out with control via Nunez (26). Stephens (5) was free to chest the ball to Downes (4) without competition from Rowe (27).
Norwich’s passive approach meant Southampton could shift the ball out to Walker-Peters (2), who advanced on the right before playing a one-two with Aribo (7). McCallum (15) and Sainz (7) both pressed Aribo (7), leaving Walker-Peters (2) free to receive. After beating McLean (23) on the edge of the box, the Saints’ right-back played the ball across the face of goal for Adam Armstrong (9) to finish.
Norwich’s persistent inability to play out with any meaningful end result, combined with their overly passive strategy without the ball, meant Wagner’s men had very few spells of settled possession. As such, their only chances – including the equaliser – came following transitional moments created by turnovers in their own half.
This piece could have been entirely dedicated to analysing Southampton. Unfortunately, that’s a damning indictment of the disparity between the coaching of the two sides.
Yes, Norwich got a point against a great side. Yes, the scoreline could’ve been so much worse. But this wasn’t the only negative strategy of the season, and don’t kid yourself into thinking such setups are sustainable or acceptable long-term at this level.
David Wagner described it as a “brave” approach given the possible backlash following a less favourable result. This view reduces football discourse to mere results-based analysis. I invite you not to conform to that view. I invite you to reach your own conclusions based on performances rather than results.
Had Josh Sargent’s equaliser bounced an inch to the left, I’d suggest we wouldn’t see a single defence of Norwich’s approach. Would it not have been a more positive form of bravery to press Southampton with aggression from minute one? To galvanise the home crowd with relentless intensity?
Instead, somewhat comically, we had the two sides walking out to ‘Welcome to the Jungle’ by Guns N’ Roses, followed by over ninety minutes of the least intimidating approach to a football game you could ever wish to see. Perhaps certain people should ask themselves if this is the type of bravery fans pay to watch; I know which type I’d prefer.