The Importance of Patterns

Finding the Free-Man

• Intentions versus patterns.

• Why do Norwich’s centre-backs often take goal-kicks?

• How does the opponent’s press determine the optimal route for ball progression?

Intentions versus patterns:

The intentions of Norwich’s build-up play have become clear under David Wagner this season. The German coach encourages provocation, a notion discussed at length in my September international break piece.

Provoking pressure is becoming more common in contemporary football, with coaches increasingly seeking a more controlled form of progression than simply ‘hoofing it’. Going long lends itself to a fifty-fifty battle; therefore, by nature, it relinquishes the possibility of control.

If you are working with capable players and, as a result, have the possibility to determine the nature and direction of ball progression, why would you choose chance? Why would you choose ‘hoofing it’?

Going long constitutes ‘playing it safe’, while playing out from the back involves taking a chance in pursuit of control. Leaving it to chance makes it more difficult to prescribe patterns of attack. Reaching the end of a build-up phase with control, on the other hand, is much easier to prepare for.

But the intention cannot merely be to provoke pressure for provocations’ sake; the aim is to manipulate the opponent’s press, exploit weaknesses, and progress the ball in a controlled manner. If the patterns of progression are flawed, the intentions are worthless.

Therein lies the difference between intentions and patterns. While Norwich’s intentions in possession are shared by tactically elite teams like Brighton, the patterns of the former are inferior to those of the latter.

Why do Norwich’s centre-backs often take goal kicks?

It may seem like an insignificant idea, but the goal kick taker plays a key role in build-up play. Typically, the goalkeeper takes goal-kicks; but when playing out from the back, this can be problematic. To understand why, we must first explore the nature of pressing.

A common pressing strategy involves forcing the opponent to one side before trapping them against the touchline. This process begins once the goalkeeper takes the goal kick: a pass to the right initiates a left-side pressing trap, while a pass to the left triggers a right-side trap. This essentially splits the pitch in half, giving the pressing team less space to cover.

But what happens if the goal-kick is played from one side to the centre? What happens if Gunn receives the first pass rather than playing it?

Instead of halving the area for possible progression, Norwich expand it by refusing to commit to playing out through one side immediately. In these situations, the ball is in play but the press cannot begin as intended.

This gives the pressing team a decision to make: they could press Gunn – potentially creating a free-man behind – or leave him free indefinitely. The former is preferable for Norwich; hence the value of provocation and the ‘sole’ gesture.

According to Roberto De Zerbi, this gesture – where a player pauses with their studs on the ball – gives the player total control. It also gives the player the autonomy to pass in either direction and, most importantly, it encourages the opponent to press.

If this press baiting is successful, a free man is created ahead of the goalkeeper and the build-up patterns can begin.

How does the opponent’s press determine the optimal route for ball progression?

Build-up patterns must depend on when and from where the opponent presses; it is this that determines who is free. To understand this idea, we can construct a hypothetical pressing system and set it up against Norwich’s 4-2-4 deep build-up shape.

Man-oriented pressing structures with a ‘plus one’ in the last-line are becoming more common for teams facing Norwich, with 3-2-4-1 and 3-2-3-2 shapes representing the most challenging structures Wagner’s side have faced.

The basic processes associated with creating a free man, as well as the corresponding patterns for optimal ball progression, can be visualised by setting Norwich’s 4-2-4 against a 3-2-4-1 pressing structure.

If the opposition forward presses Gunn, the centre-backs are left free. It is at this moment, once the forward has arrived, that a centre-back should receive the ball.

It can be more effective to reach a free centre-back via a holding midfielder; this ensures the pressing striker is as far away as possible from the player receiving the pass, while also making it more likely that a midfielder will follow the pass and join the press.

If this player does join the first line of pressure, the holding midfielder on that side becomes free and should receive a pass. However, if the pressing player ensures the passing lane to the free man is blocked, the movement of the occupied holding midfielder becomes crucial.

This player should drop to provide an angle for a bounce pass to the free midfielder. The execution of this pattern is important: a pass to an occupied player is a risk, but by playing a pass with one touch, the pressing player is unlikely to have time to force a turnover.

Alternatively, if the opposition winger joins the press, the full-back becomes free. There are a few ways in which the full-back can be accessed, including a clipped pass from the goalkeeper or, preferably, a bounce pass from a midfielder or false nine to provoke their markers to press.

But these patterns can become more complicated against a 3-2-3-2 pressing structure. With two strikers using their cover shadows to block passing lanes to the midfielders, the attacking midfielder is given just one job: to occupy the free player behind a pressing striker.

Assuming only one striker presses at a time, this system means the Norwich midfielders will always be occupied. This is a problem Norwich are beginning to face, so what is the solution?

Once a team introduces ‘jumping’ to their pressing structure – where a pressing player is given a dual responsibility to move between two opposition players – the system becomes dependent on the timing of the jumps. If players are late to jump, they risk leaving an opponent free temporarily.

In this context, the team in possession should adjust to manipulate the timing of the opponent’s press. This can be done by changing the distances between players. Against a 3-2-3-2 shape, for example, Norwich’s deepest midfielders could risk moving further apart, while the two false nine’s move towards the centre.

This adjustment would expand the space the jumping player is required to cover and, in doing so, increase the likelihood of a midfielder becoming free.

By moving closer together, the deep-lying forwards would create a passing lane behind the first and second lines of pressure. Norwich could then access the midfielders via bounce passes from the forwards.

You might be wondering why these patterns have taken up a whole article. You may be wondering why it matters how you break the opponent’s press.

Ultimately, the quality of your build-up often determines the quality of the chances you create. If you provoke numerous opposition players to press, and if you play through multiple lines of pressure quickly, you can play into the final third before the opponent has time to retreat into their defensive structure.

Under David Wagner, Norwich’s deep build-up structure has the potential to be highly effective, but his side are too heavily reliant on creating chances from periods of settled possession. Once the opponent has dropped into a low block, chance creation becomes more difficult, and defensive transitions become more of a risk.

With tough games coming after the break, Norwich’s build-up patterns and defensive solidity will be tested; how they fare may determine the level of patience fans are prepared to show David Wagner.