A Stark Contrast
Score: 3 – 1
Possession (%): 63 – 37
Passes: 576 – 342
Shots: 17 – 9
xG: 2.61 – 0.72
• Sunderland’s aggressive press.
• Norwich’s negative build-up play.
• Sunderland’s fluidity within a clear structure.
• Norwich’s passive new formation.
Base Formations:
Norwich’s trip to the North East saw David Wagner tweak his side’s formation. Adam Forshaw came in to create a 4-5-1 shape, while Fisher, Fassnacht, and Hwang were direct replacements for Stacey, Hernandez, and Idah.
Tony Mowbray made just one change to his Sunderland side, with Nazariy Rusyn replacing Mason Burstow up front in the host’s 4-1-4-1.
Despite Norwich’s formation change, the visitors transitioned into their usual 4-2-4 deep build-up shape. Surprisingly, it was Forshaw (29) in a false-nine role alongside Ui-Jo (31), while Sara (17) remained in a double pivot with McLean (23).
Sunderland initially transitioned into an aggressive man-to-man pressing system, leaving only George Long (12) unoccupied in a plus one in Norwich’s favour.
Bellingham (7) joined Rusyn (15) in a front two, and the host’s centre-backs jumped onto the visitor’s double false-nine, leaving the full-backs to occupy Fassnacht (16) and Rowe (27).
Norwich’s recent success in provoking pressure before finding the free man was largely abandoned, with the aptly named City goalkeeper frequently choosing to go long.
The intention was to exploit the space around the 1v1s created by Sunderland’s aggressive, man-to-man last-line.
While this strategy is a perfectly acceptable build-up variation to exploit such an aggressive press, the frequency with which Norwich attempted it made it virtually impossible to generate controlled attacks.
Instead, Norwich relied on a large degree of luck to create attacks from spells both with and without the ball. In possession, they had to hope they could win second balls; out of possession, they relied on forcing turnovers to generate counter-attacks.
Going long became an even less effective means of chance creation once Sunderland had taken the lead, with the hosts creating a 3-2-3-2 pressing structure with a plus one at the back. Norwich failed to adapt to this change.
In Sunderland’s deep build-up, they created a 4-2-4-1 shape with Patterson (1) temporarily becoming a right centre-back, while O’Nien (13) moved wide and Hume (32) inverted from right-back.
Norwich’s highest pressing phase was generally ineffective, with the visitors failing to force high turnovers. But given their failure to force Sunderland back, these phases of play were rare.
While Fassnacht (29) successfully jumped to press Huggins (2) on the right, there was a clear weakness on Norwich’s left.
With Rowe (27) and McLean (23) too deep, Sara (17) was left to jump between Hume (32) and O’Nien (13); as a result, Sunderland were often able to play out relatively unchallenged.
For the most part, Saturday’s game was played with Sunderland in settled possession while Norwich sat deep.
Prior to their rotations, the host’s base shape was a 4-1-4-1, while Norwich’s flat 4-5-1 low-block was typically very passive; only the full-backs and wingers pressed with any real intensity.
There were numerous variations in Sunderland’s settled-play shape, with Tony Mowbray’s players free to rotate within a clear structure.
Hume (32) frequently inverted into a double pivot with Ekwah (39), while Huggins (2) became a hybrid left centre-back, creating a 3-2-4-1 shape.
These rotations gave Sunderland clear positional and numerical advantages on both sides of Norwich’s midfield wall of five, while also opening wide passing lanes to improve the accessibility of the wingers.
Forshaw (29) was forced to join Ui-Jo (31) in pressing the double pivot, leaving Bellingham (7) in space behind, where the hosts had a 5v4 last-line advantage. The wingers stayed wide to isolate the full-backs in 2v1s.
Frequent positional interchanges made the hosts difficult to track, with Hume (32), O’Nien (13), and Huggins (2) alternately joining the attack to create wide overloads.
Most notably, Sunderland captain Luke O’Nien (13) played a key role in these rotations, with the stand-in centre-back occasionally moving into the right wide area or half space. If Roberts (10) was wide, O’Nien (13) would underlap; but if the former Norwich winger inverted, the centre-back overlapped.
Aside from their fluidity, however, Sunderland’s ability to maintain a clear structure was, for the most part, hugely impressive.
When O’Nien (13) advanced, Hume (32) would slot in as a right centre-back, and Dan Neil (24) was ready to support Ekwah (39) in a double pivot.
However, given the passive nature of Norwich’s press and the large space between the defensive and midfield lines, at 1-0 down Sunderland were able to overload the last line with six or seven players while Ekway (39) dropped into a situational back three.
Ordinarily, this would be an overly aggressive approach compromising the defensive solidity of the side in possession; but it was facilitated by Norwich’s negativity, which allowed the hosts to create multiple chances before half-time.
A more effective and man-oriented, albeit still conservative, 4-5-1 press could have included more aggressive hybrid roles for the full-backs and wingers.
With Fassnacht (16) and Rowe (27) blocking passing lanes to the wingers, the full-backs could have stayed tight to Neil (24) and Bellingham (7).
A pass to a wide centre-back would be the trigger for the ball-side winger to jump, leaving the full-back to occupy the winger while McLean (23) or the nearest Norwich centre-back would jump onto the player in the ball-side half space.
This press would have reduced the time Sunderland players were given in possession, thereby increasing the likelihood of forcing turnovers and preventing the last-line overloads the hosts were frequently able to exploit.
Although Norwich eventually adjusted their pressing structure, with McLean dropping in at centre-back as Idah replaced Gibson to create a front two, David Wagner’s late changes had an air of desperation rather than strategy.
Ultimately, Norwich’s inefficacy in possession, coupled with their passive press, was a recipe for disappointment.
It also represented the latest instalment of David Wagner’s uncharacteristic, negative game-plans – a transition often symbolising the beginning of the end for a head coach.
Hopeful long balls in possession, a passive 4-5-1 low-block, time wasting after fifteen minutes – this is not how a Norwich side should look in the Championship. Avoiding having the ball in settled possession is not exactly the best solution to the defensive transition problems.
But the issues at Norwich go beyond just David Wagner.
Facing a Sunderland side with a clear identity, and a starting eleven with an average age of over four years younger than Norwich’s, provided a fitting contrast – a contrast not just between the two sides involved, but between the outfit Stuart Webber sought to create and the one he leaves behind.
While that should not absolve a struggling head coach, on a human level it becomes hard not to feel for him ahead of Sunday.