Southampton Vs Norwich

Verticality and Transitions

Score: 4 – 4

Possession (%): 70 – 30

Passes: 709 – 307

Shots: 31 – 15

xG: 3.76 – 2.06

• Norwich’s overly vertical build-up.

• Turnovers and transitional moments.

• Blocking central ball progression.

• Norwich’s more controlled verticality in the second half.

Base Formations:

Russell Martin’s Southampton were set up in a 4-3-3 base formation with a single pivot and two advanced number eights. Wagner’s Norwich lined up in an unchanged 4-4-2 base structure.

Norwich built up in a 4-2-4 (4-2-2-2) shape with a double pivot, two deep-lying forwards, and wide wingers. By dropping both strikers into a midfield box, Norwich created an overload beyond the first two lines of pressure.

Southampton pressed in a 4-1-3-2 shape, a similar pressing structure to that of Wagner’s men, albeit created differently. Alcaraz (22) joined Adam Armstrong (9) to create a front two, while Stuart Armstrong (17) moved between Tella (11) and Edozie (23) to create the second line of pressure.

Southampton’s temporary front two were tasked with blocking passing lanes to Norwich’s double pivot. But with Gunn creating a 3v2 overload, this was a difficult task. As a result, the next lines of pressure needed to be well organised to prevent further overloads.

The hosts allowed Norwich’s initial 3v2 overload, but they pressed with man-orientation in the next lines by shifting to each side to man-mark the double pivot and the ball-side full back.

Smallbone (16) and the centre-backs’ roles in Southampton’s press were crucial. When Norwich played out to one side, Smallbone jumped onto the ball-side deep-lying forward while the nearest centre back jumped onto the far-side forward.

Norwich played with verticality to access the front four beyond the host’s press. The hope was that by being more direct, Norwich would be able to overload Smallbone (16) before Southampton could engage man-to-man.

The centre-backs often took goal kicks and passed back to Gunn. This may seem insignificant, but it ensured Southampton could not shift to one side, and Smallbone (16) was left between Barnes and Sargent in a 2v1 before a centre back could jump.

Gunn often used either the forwards or the wingers as out-balls. Out-balls played to Hernandez and Rowe were bounced back towards Barnes and Sargent, while balls played directly to the front two were bounced out to the full-backs to attack the space around the Southampton full-backs.

By not committing to playing out down one side, Norwich were able to play with verticality to bypass the first and second lines of pressure before exploiting positional overloads on the edge of their half.

But this approach lends itself to a transitional game given the high probability of turnovers with direct build-up play. Norwich were often too quick to go long; they were overly vertical at times.

There were numerous occasions in the first half in which Norwich missed opportunities to play out via their double pivot and full-backs. As a result, Norwich lacked control and often invited pressure by conceding easy turnovers.

Much of Norwich’s success against Hull came from settled play. These moments were limited on the south coast, with the visitors rarely in control for a sustained period. But when they did have control, Wagner’s men created a 3-1-3-3 with McLean behind Sara in a back three.

Southampton responded by dropping into a 4-3-2-1 mid-block, with the wingers often dropping behind Stuart Armstrong (17) and Alcaraz (22) to mark Norwich’s inverting wingers.

Southampton’s mid-block created a central 3v3 situation, but Sara was often free to move into the half spaces to create an overload. The fluidity of this system helped to dissociate Southampton’s marking; this, combined with Sara’s elite quality, proved to be dangerous for the hosts.

By trying to prevent central overloads, Southampton were forced to concede space in wide areas. Stacey and Giannoulis stayed wide to exploit these spaces, while the midfielders and strikers stayed narrow.

This was exactly the situation Norwich created to go 1-0 up. Most players stayed narrow to engage Southampton markers in central areas, leaving Stacey isolated in acres of space from which he was able to cross to players attacking the box.

In the first phase of their build-up, Southampton transitioned into a 2-3-2-3 shape with Smallbone (16) as the single pivot between two inverting full-backs. Alcaraz (22) and Stuart Armstrong (17) stayed in the half spaces as advanced eights to ensure each of the five attacking corridors were occupied.

Norwich pressed in a 4-1-3-2 structure, with Sara or McLean joining the second line of pressure behind Barnes and Sargent.

One of Southampton’s advanced eights occasionally dropped deep to create a 2v1 overload against Norwich’s pressing central midfielder. But the visitors’ deeper midfielder joined the press to prevent such a situation.

With Sara and McLean both committed to the press, one of Norwich’s centre-backs was required to jump onto the remaining Southampton advanced eight to prevent a 3v2 overload in midfield.

While both sides pressed in 4-1-3-2 shapes with the centre-backs required to join the press to prevent overloads, Norwich were more reserved in the first pressing phase.

The visitors only pressed aggressively once Southampton’s ball progression began.

Unlike the visitors, Southampton often had possession in settled play. In these moments, Norwich transitioned into a compact 4-4-2 mid-block. The hosts created a 4-1-2-3 or 2-3-2-3 shape depending on the positioning of their inverted full-backs.

Norwich’s narrow shape out of possession was designed to allow Southampton to have possession in low-risk areas before pressing aggressively to force turnovers once the hosts tried to progress centrally.

The midfield four were tasked with blocking passing lanes towards Southampton’s advanced eights. By blocking the half spaces, Norwich left passing lanes open to the wingers. This forced the hosts around the outside of Norwich’s pressing structure.

By forcing Southampton into wide areas, Norwich were able to reduce the speed with which the hosts could progress, thereby allowing the visitors more time to defend. Instead of progressing between the lines and into half spaces, Southampton had to rely on rotations in the wide corridors to create chances.

The ball-side full-back moved wide to create a triangle with the ball-side winger and advanced eight, while the far-side full-back stayed narrow on the defensive diagonal to allow the hosts to move to the other side if Norwich successfully shifted to block progression on the ball-side.

Norwich shifted to both sides effectively and tracked underlapping and overlapping runs from the wingers, advanced eights, and inverted full-backs. This further limited the chances Southampton were able to create in settled play.

While Wagner’s men conceded few chances from settled play, both sides allowed far too many turnovers and struggled to defend in the transitional moments that followed. Southampton lost possession frequently in settled play, while Norwich’s overly vertical build-up invited pressure in their deep build-up phases.

In the second half, Norwich played with more controlled verticality as they looked to progress via bounce passes between the full-backs and a staggered double pivot. Sara and McLean often moved over to the same side to ensure Norwich could play with verticality without going long and risking an easy turnover.

Despite the moments of defensive chaos on both sides, it was another good performance from Norwich on Saturday. But it was a performance in complete contrast to the exceptional display against Hull.

While Norwich’s season opener was characterised by controlled tactical superiority, their trip to St. Mary’s was determined by transitions. There is still work to do in defensive situations, and Norwich need to avoid being overly vertical at times, but the success Wagner’s men have found in both games perfectly illustrates the tactical versatility of his side.

Saturday was not just a reflection of how far Norwich have come but also of their shift in philosophy. Southampton’s intent to dominate the ball used to be matched by Norwich under Daniel Farke. But ask yourself this: which style is more conducive to premier league survival without major investment – relying on dominating possession or attempting to profit from transitions?