Raising the Ceiling: Analysing Norwich Out of Possession
“The football I’ve enjoyed watching has been attacking, proactive football where teams try to control the game with the ball.”
These were the words of Norwich’s new Sporting Director, Ben Knapper, as he sat in front of a camera for the first time since his appointment in November.
Knapper explains that he wants his teams to “control the game” in possession. But we’ve been here before; a new Norwich Sporting Director wanting to dominate the ball, sound familiar?
In 2017, Stuart Webber began his era citing a similar desire. But Norwich continued to hit the same Premier League ceiling, failing to rise above 20th at both attempts during Webber’s tenure.
It raised an inevitable question: is it possible for promoted clubs to survive in the Premier League with a squad assembled to ‘control’ games? The answer is yes, but phases both with and without the ball must be considered when we discuss ‘control’.
“They’re the protagonists in the game; they want to go and win the ball back high and be aggressive”, Ben Knapper continued. This is the out-of-possession aspect, and it’s a crucial ingredient for Premier League survival.
But how do David Wagner’s Norwich set up in these phases, and how have opponents attempted to manipulate them?
Hybrid Pressing: Norwich’s High Pressing Phases
In their highest pressing phases, Wagner’s Norwich consistently transition into a 4-1-3-2 before their press becomes active.
Behind the first line of pressure, the wingers occupy positions on either side of an advanced midfielder, while the remaining midfielder sits in front of Norwich’s back four.
At this point, it would be sensible to explain the notion of ‘hybrid pressing’, a term coined by Tifo Football writer and presenter Jon Mackenzie.
Hybrid pressing acts as a compromise between two established pressing systems, including those based on man-orientation and more zonally oriented approaches.
Man-orientation involves using opposing players as the reference point for positions. This often creates high-risk, high-reward man-to-man pressing systems, either with 1v1s all over or with a plus one in the last line.
Zonally oriented systems, on the other hand, involve more of a focus on zones and spaces as reference points for player positions.
This creates clear defensive structures with a focus on controlling defensive spaces. Such systems are often overly passive, allowing opponents to dominate possession before eventually being broken down.
Hybrid pressing structures attempt to profit from the advantages of man-to-man and zonal systems, while limiting the disadvantages of both. But what makes these systems hybrid?
The word ‘hybrid’ suggests a combination of two elements. In pressing, it involves combining man and zone-orientation. Players aren’t organised in a complete man-to-man fashion, nor are they confined within a rigid structure. Instead, players may create man-to-man situations on the ball-side before dropping into a zonally organised structure in settled possession.
After initially creating a clear structure in high pressing phases, players may begin a series of ‘jumps’ between opponents. Players have ‘hybrid’ roles, moving between opposing players rather than taking responsibility for just one. Such roles are often noticeable when analysing the dynamics of Norwich’s high press.
In the opponent’s deepest build-up phases, City’s front two jump from the pivots to press high. The ball-side winger then presses the full-back, while the advanced centre-midfielder jumps onto the ball-side pivot and the far-side winger presses the free pivot.
These dynamics create a man-to-man situation on the ball-side while maintaining an overload in the last pressing line. But these advantages must create a disadvantage somewhere; in this instance, a weakness emerges on the far-side.
After these high pressing phases, Norwich drop into a zonal 4-4-2 mid-block.
How have teams manipulated Norwich’s high press?
While Norwich’s high press has generally been effective in forcing opponents to play out towards the touchlines, they’ve had numerous issues behind the second line of pressure. Teams regularly find ways to manipulate Norwich’s press, so let’s explore exactly how recent opponents have done so.
Bristol City
At the start of December, Norwich beat Liam Manning’s Bristol City. But the ease with which Bristol manipulated Norwich’s high press provided a perfect example of Norwich’s struggles out of possession.
Bristol set up in a 3-4-2-1 in their deep build-up. Once Norwich’s touchline trap began, with Rowe (27) drawn to Bristol’s left centre-back (3), it was crucial that Stacey (3) backed up the press by jumping onto Sykes (17), the left wing-back.
But Stacey (3) was frequently late to jump, often staying with attacking midfielder Jason Knight (12), leaving Sara (17) to shift over to press Sykes (17). With Pring (3) moving wide and Knight (12) dropping behind Sara (17), Bristol were able to create a passing angle beyond Norwich’s initial lines of pressure.
On occasion, however, Sara (17) had too far to jump out to Bristol’s left wing, leaving an easy pass to the wing-back (17).
Liam Manning’s side also manipulated Norwich’s press when Pring (3) stayed narrow and Sykes (17) pinned Stacey (3) in his own half. Once Rowe (27) pressed the left centre-back (3), he allowed Knight (12) to drop and receive. This exposed the 2v1 overload against Sara (17) in the third line of pressure.
Once they had broken through Norwich’s initial pressing lines, Bristol were able to access the far-side weakness often created by hybrid pressing systems. Such situations highlight the need for effective and coordinated ‘jumps’ in high pressing phases.
In settled phases of possession, Bristol exposed another of Norwich’s pressing flaws. This flaw is most common against teams that create a back three in possession.
In such scenarios, Norwich’s wingers are occasionally drawn to press a wide centre-back. With the players in Norwich’s second line of pressure failing to anticipate this movement, and those in the first line leaving passing lanes open, the advanced centre-midfielder can be exposed in a 2v1 against a double pivot.
Queens Park Rangers
In November, Marti Cifuentes’ QPR exposed a similar weakness in settled phases. Norwich’s wingers (25 and 16) were far too wide for effective ‘jumps’ to occur between the QPR pivots (8 and 4), leaving Sara (17) exposed in a 2v1.
QPR were also able to manipulate Norwich’s deeper phases out of possession when David Wagner’s men dropped into their zonal 4-4-2 mid-block. By creating a situational midfield three, Cifuentes’ side were able to create numerical and positional advantages against Norwich’s two midfielders.
Ipswich Town
In the first East Anglian Derby since 2019, Kieran McKenna’s Ipswich manipulated Norwich’s out-of-possession dynamics in every phase.
In high pressing phases, Norwich created their usual 4-1-3-2 shape before organised ‘jumps’ created a man-to-man touchline trap. But Conor Chaplin (10) frequently dropped deep into his own half to create a ball-side overload. In the deeper midfield role, Sara (17) was too far away to jump onto Chaplin (10).
As a result, McCallum (15) was forced to jump onto the Ipswich attacking midfielder, leaving Burns (7) with space to run into before McLean (23) could back up the press.
In settled phases of play, Norwich were more aggressive than usual. The dynamics of their zonal 4-4-2 mid-block matched those of their higher pressing phases, with the midfielders aggressively shifting over to the ball-side while the full-backs stayed narrow.
McKenna’s men would then shift over to the far-side to exploit the disadvantage Norwich had created on that side.
Raising the Ceiling
But why is any of this significant? Especially given that Norwich were unbeaten in the games I’ve analysed in this article.
The truth is, regardless of results, the regularity with which teams are manipulating Norwich’s press is concerning. Players should be proactive in high pressing phases, they should anticipate their opponent’s next move, and they should develop a ‘feel’ for the moments to ‘jump’.
‘Hybrid pressing’ is not the problem – in fact, some of the best out-of-possession coaches employ this method – but the dynamics of Norwich’s press aren’t yet optimal. It is, at least, better than many of Wagner’s negative setups without the ball.
In many games, particularly away from home, Wagner has opted for overly passive pressing strategies. Such approaches should be deemed unacceptable for Norwich in this division; they also contradict Ben Knapper’s long-term vision.
In truth, it isn’t a positive reflection on Wagner that Norwich’s out-of-possession strategy either involves an overly passive low-block or an easily manipulated high press. Promoted teams that survive and excel in the Premier League are those that reduce their reliance on phases in possession by mastering their game without the ball.
If Ben Knapper is to raise Norwich’s ceiling, he must understand the significance of phases out of possession when considering the notion of ‘control’.