Norwich Vs Rotherham

Norwich Vs Rotherham: From transitions to control, and the challenges Norwich faced.

Score: 0 - 0

Possession (%): 68 - 32

xG: 1.56 - 0.52

· Norwich’s build-up against Rotherham’s narrow pressing structure.

· Temporary full back inversions.

· The ‘overload to isolate’ principle.

· Drawing the press with offensive depth.

Base Formations:

On the back of an impressive performance against Blackburn, Norwich set up in a similar 4-2-3-1 shape. But, with Hanley and Gibson both unavailable, Sorenson was forced to drop into the back four. This changed the balance of the side, as Pukki came in to play with Sargent, and Gibbs dropped from a number ten role into a double pivot alongside Sara. Rotherham were set up in a compact 4-1-4-1 base formation.

When playing out from the back, Norwich used two primary build-up structures. The first involved their standard 2-4-1-3 shape, where Sorenson and Omabamidele dropped alongside Gunn. Aarons, Gibbs, Sara, and McCallum then made up the second line, while Sargent sat in the space behind a front three.

Another first phase build-up shape saw Gibbs drift out wide to take Max Aarons’ place at right back, thereby allowing Aarons to move into the double pivot alongside Sara. When Norwich progressed into the second build-up phase, it led to the creation of a 3-2 build-up shape. Against a back four, this is a much better build-up shape than the 3-1 shape we often see when a midfielder drops into a back three. The 3-2 shape provides a solid rest defence and short central passing options.

With Norwich playing out from goal kicks, Rotherham temporarily transitioned into a 4-1-3-2 shape as Rathbone (18) moved alongside Jordan Hugill; this ensured neither of Norwich’s centre backs were free in the first phase of their build-up, and it blocked passing lanes to Norwich’s double pivot.

Once Norwich played out to one of their full backs, Rathbone re-joined Rotherham’s midfield four to create a narrow 4-1-4-1. Lindsay (16) and Rathbone (18) man-marked Sara and Gibbs respectively, as Fosu (7) and Ogbene (11) were tasked with applying pressure to the full backs. Conor Coventry marked Sargent and often kept him in his cover shadow to prevent Norwich’s central ball progression.

Rotherham’s moderate press created space between their back line and pressing five. But, unlike against Blackburn, Norwich failed to exploit this space early in their build-up. With Sargent being marked by Conor Coventry (4), Norwich were unable to use him as an easy target, and he often blocked passing lanes to Marquinhos and Hernandez when moving into the half spaces.

On Friday, Norwich were able to break through Blackburn’s press through fast, vertical ball progression towards Gibbs and Sargent; but on Monday, Norwich often relied on breaking Rotherham down during the latter stages of their build-up. This was more difficult with Rotherham sat back in a compact 4-1-4-1 shape.

In the second phase of Norwich’s build-up, their 2-4-1-3 shape was altered as Liam Gibbs frequently dropped into a back three. Sara remained in midfield while Sargent occupied the space between Rotherham’s defensive and midfield lines. With each of the five vertical corridors occupied, Norwich created a 3-2-5 shape with a staggered midfield two.

Rotherham’s full backs, Bramall (3) and Harding (2), often jumped to press Aarons or McCallum from deep. The away sides’ wingers were then forced to jump onto Marquinhos or Hernandez to prevent wide overloads.

When one of Norwich’s full backs were involved in the build-up, Sargent would move alongside Pukki as the ball-side winger moved out wide; this maintained the occupation of each vertical corridor.

This rotation created space for Norwich’s full backs to invert and underlap into the half spaces; this was particularly noticeable on the right side when Aaron’s occasionally drifted inside during the first build-up phase.

With Norwich forcing Rotherham back into their defensive third, the away side’s marking became less man orientated as the focus shifted to controlling dangerous spaces: known as space orientated marking.

It wasn’t uncommon to see Rotherham’s ball-side winger drop into a back five to nullify Norwich’s 5v4 overload in the final third. Hugill (10) would then drop into midfield so that Rathbone (18) or Lindsay (16) could move towards the wings.

A large proportion of Norwich’s possession came in these situations, with Rotherham sat back in their own half. When building-up from deep, your opponent creates depth by pressing, this is not the case when trying to play into the final third with every opposition player behind the ball. In these moments you must create your own space.

There are numerous methods of creating space in these circumstances. One method is the ‘overload to isolate’ principle. This involves overloading one side of the pitch before quickly switching to a free player on the opposite side. Norwich frequently created these situations, but they rarely moved the ball to the free player fast enough. As a result, Rotherham were able to shift over to apply pressure to the free player.

Norwich could also do more to draw opposition players into a press. With a flat front five this is nearly impossible. By creating offensive depth, opposition players would be forced to make a difficult decision; they could either choose not to press, leaving a Norwich player unmarked in space, or they could choose to press and risk creating space for a forward to run into.

Rotherham restricted the value of Norwich’s aggressive press by going long from goal kicks; as a result, Norwich were unable to benefit from high turnovers. More and more teams are doing this when facing Wagner’s Norwich, it eliminates a key method of chance creation.

Rotherham presented a totally different challenge to the one David Wagner’s men faced against Blackburn. Attacking transitions – the moment a side regains possession after a spell without the ball – are a key source of chance creation for Wagner. At Blackburn, Norwich were able to profit from these moments with the home side having the majority of the ball.

Against Rotherham, however, Norwich had 68 percent possession. Creating chances from an attacking transition is a totally different skill to creating chances when dominating the ball; the latter is one facet of the game Norwich need to be better at.

Although Norwich created chances on Monday, the quality of the chances you create are determined by the nature of your build up. Norwich need to do more to break down defensively compact teams.