Norwich Vs Millwall

A Transformation?

Score: 3 – 1

Possession (%): 56 – 44

Passes: 509 – 415

Shots: 20 – 10

xG: 1.73 – 0.49

• Midfield fluidity and positional interchanges.

• Breaking the lines with ease.

• Bounce passes and counter-pressing.

• A lacklustre Millwall.

Base Formations:

Norwich lined up in their usual 4-4-2 base formation, but their fluidity meant the hosts were rarely in this shape in possession. One of Norwich’s centre-forwards, most often Barnes, dropped between the lines into a number ten position; on paper, this creates a 4-2-3-1 base shape.

With Onel Hernandez injured, Swiss international Christian Fassnacht came into David Wagner’s side. This personnel change saw Jonathan Rowe switch sides to start as Norwich’s left winger, while Fassnacht started on his preferred right side.

In the absence of left wing-back Joe Bryan, Millwall abandoned their usual 3-4-3 shape and matched up with their hosts in a more rigid 4-4-2.

Norwich built up in what has become a familiar structure this season, with Barnes and Sargent dropping deep to create a 4-2-4 with a midfield box. But Norwich’s double pivot and deep-lying forwards were not confined to designated sides or zones, with the quartet regularly switching positions.

The visitors remained in a 4-4-2 shape out of possession as their front two unsuccessfully attempted to block passing lanes to Norwich’s double pivot, while Mitchell (8) and Saville (23) stayed tight to Barnes and Sargent.

For the most part, Millwall’s high press was virtually non-existent; the visitors seemed content with allowing Norwich’s centre-backs time in possession. While this is not uncommon in the first pressing phase, a reactive approach such as this requires a well-planned pressing strategy in the latter phases.

There are numerous possible pressing strategies – be it man-orientated, zone-orientated, space-orientated, or various combinations of all three – but Millwall appeared to have the weaknesses of zonal and man-orientated systems with the strengths of neither.

Zonal systems, where players are responsible for occupying a pre-determined zone, can become disengaged when opposing players are allowed to move into space without being followed. Man-orientated systems, on the other hand, may leave a pressing team susceptible to manipulation. By following an opposing player, a man-marker may be dragged out of position to create space for another opponent.

Millwall were disengaged and lacked man-orientation but, due to Norwich’s positional interchanges, they were also dragged out of position. This left vast spaces for Norwich to attack.

In Norwich’s deep build-up, with Mitchell (8) and Saville (23) preoccupied by Barnes and Sargent, the visitors’ midfield duo were unable to jump onto Sara or McLean. This meant that Millwall’s front two could not press Duffy or Gibson without leaving a free man behind.

The fluidity with which Norwich played further exacerbated Millwall’s problematic structure. Barnes (10) often dropped into a double pivot with McLean or Sara, thus provoking a Millwall midfielder to press, leaving space between the lines for Norwich to exploit.

[Attachment 4]

In settled play, Sara or McLean dropped into a back three. This was the signal for Fassnacht and Rowe to invert, allowing Stacey and Giannoulis to advance on both flanks. Ashley Barnes frequently dropped between Norwich’s inverted wingers to create a 3-1-3-3 shape.

Millwall’s narrow 4-4-2 was totally disengaged in this phase of play; they failed to track runners and failed to apply pressure to the ball players and receivers. Without possession, teams should apply pressure from the front, set pressing traps, or sit back and block passing lanes. Millwall failed to do all three.

Norwich’s single pivot, inverted wingers, and deep-lying centre forward were all accessible in space between the lines. Allowing a player of Gabriel Sara’s quality so much time on the ball was a huge risk.

The fluidity of Wagner’s side continued in settled play, with Barnes and Sargent given the freedom to drop in and out of Norwich’s double pivot. This further disengaged and disorientated Millwall’s press.

Norwich occasionally created a 4-2-3-1 in settled play when McLean and Sara remained in midfield. With Millwall’s wingers staying narrow to block ball progression towards Norwich’s inverted wingers, Giannoulis and Stacey were given space to receive.

In these situations, Millwall’s full-backs were forced to jump onto their counterparts. This created space for Rowe and Fassnacht to attack, as was the case in the build-up to Norwich’s opening goal.

Once Norwich advanced into the final third, they created a 6v4 last-line numerical advantage. The hosts used this advantage to access the half spaces via bounce passes to their inverted wingers.

The presence of Barnes and Sargent forced Millwall’s centre-backs to engage the centre-forward duo; this, combined with the width provided by Giannoulis and Stacey, created space between the centre-backs and full-backs for Rowe and Fassnacht to exploit.

A key feature of Norwich’s performance was their counter-press. They were able to sustain pressure thanks to their intensity in defensive transitions. By surrounding the ball after turnovers, Norwich minimised Millwall counter-attacks and starved them of the ball for significant periods.

With Millwall avoiding any form of deep build-up play by going long, Norwich’s fast counter-press was the key to nullifying the visitors’ escape routes. It was also the only chance the hosts had to force high turnovers.

In settled play, Millwall transitioned into a 4-2-4 shape as the wingers joined Flemming (10) and Nisbet (7) in a front four ahead of Mitchell (8) and Saville (23). The wingers stayed narrow, allowing the full-backs to provide the width.

Out of possession, Norwich dropped into a 4-4-2 mid-block with the front two blocking passes to Mitchell and Saville while pressing the ball-side centre-back. Rowe and Fassnacht were quick to press the Millwall full-backs when they received passes from the centre-backs, with Giannoulis and Stacey backing up the press on Millwall’s wingers.

Once Barnes or Sargent started pressing their nearest centre-back, McLean or Sara would jump onto the free holding midfielder while Duffy and Gibson stayed tight to the Millwall centre-forwards.

The Millwall double pivot often failed to move out of Barnes and Sargent’s cover shadows, leaving the visitors without a clear route for ball progression. Ultimately, their build-up play lacked energy and ideas; there was no obvious tactical plan to manipulate Norwich’s structure.

In the second half, there appeared to be a slight adjustment to Millwall’s press as Watmore (19) and Esse (25) inverted during Norwich’s first build-up phase. This created a 4-2-2-2 shape and partially resolved Millwall’s disorganised press.

By inverting the wingers, Millwall’s front two were able to press without leaving Sara and McLean free. But once Norwich played out towards their full-backs, the visitors’ ball-side winger was forced to leave a midfielder free. Saville (23) or Mitchell (8) would then jump onto the free midfielder, leaving Barnes or Sargent temporarily free before a centre-back joined the press.

Aside from Millwall’s shortcomings, Norwich continue to reap the rewards of their tactical and individual improvements. Having had a full pre-season with a refreshed squad, the influence of Wagner and his coaching staff is becoming clear.

The German has implemented a clear, yet adaptable, philosophy with players perfectly suited to the roles within his system.

Dean Smith was reactionary without a clear philosophy; Daniel Farke was ideological without adaptability. But David Wagner appears to be striking a balance between the two, combining his clear philosophy with the ability to adapt to opponents. Given the nature of last season, Wagner’s impact is nothing short of a transformation.