Two things can be true at once
Score: 2 – 3
Possession (%): 46 – 54
Passes: 373 – 453
Shots: 14 – 19
xG: 0.92 – 1.49
• Norwich’s build-up improvements.
• Flawed pressing structures.
• A defensive catch-22 and Leeds’ formation change.
• Middlesbrough concerns.
Base Formations:
On Daniel Farke’s return to Carrow Road, both teams lined up in 4-2-3-1 base formations. Giannoulis and Hernandez came back into David Wagner’s side, while Farke’s Leeds remained unchanged.
Norwich built-up in a 4-2-4 shape, with McLean (23) and Sara (17) dropping to the edge of the host’s penalty area behind Idah (11) and Gibbs (8). Duffy (24) and Gibson (6) dropped alongside Gunn to create an initial line of three.
In response, Leeds transitioned into a 4-1-3-2 shape as Rutter (24) and Piroe (7) created a front two ahead of Kamara (8), who sat just behind Norwich’s double pivot. Ethan Ampadu (4) occupied the space between the deep-lying forwards.
As has become common this season, Norwich’s goal-kicks were often played from a centre-back to Gunn (28) who, with the ball at his feet, waited for a Leeds forward to press. When one player was provoked, Norwich’s build-up patterns could begin.
If the right-sided centre-forward pressed, for example, Gunn (28) accessed the free centre-back on the same side via a bounce pass from Kenny McLean (23).
Glen Kamara’s (8) role was to occupy the free Norwich pivot behind the pressing Leeds striker, who curved his run to force a pass to one side. But Norwich often successfully provoked both centre-forwards to press.
With a 3v2 first-line advantage, a centre-back always became free, while Kamara (8) was left in a 2v1 against Sara (17) and McLean (23).
Another build-up pattern saw the hosts play out to a full-back while the ball-side pivot moved towards the touchline. With the Leeds winger jumping to press the full-back, and Kamara (8) caught between both Norwich pivots, the hosts could easily bypass Leeds’ press before Piroe (7) could track back.
The visitor’s pressing structure was designed to create a touchline trap on both sides. With Kamara (8) and Ampadu (4) responsible for two players each, the Leeds midfield duo waited for Norwich to play to one side before pressing the ball-side pivot and deep-lying forward.
But this strategy was problematic for two reasons. Norwich often successfully baited the first line of pressure before committing to playing out to one side; as a result, Kamara (8) and Ampadu (4) were left in a central 4v2 without knowing which side to press.
This 4v2 overload also created a far-side weakness when the Leeds duo attempted to enact the touchline trap.
Leeds’ structure was also exploited when Norwich were transitioning into their settled play shape. With the inverting wingers initially followed by the visitor’s full-backs, Giannoulis (30) and Stacey (3) became free when they overlapped.
If the Leeds full-backs began marking their Norwich counterparts, however, Hernandez (25) and Rowe (27) became free between the lines of Leeds’ 4-4-2.
In their deep build-up, Leeds created a similar shape to their hosts: the centre-backs dropped alongside the goalkeeper to create a first line of three behind a double pivot and two wide full-backs. But the visitor’s centre-backs started much wider than Gibson (6) and Duffy (24), and only one of Rutter (24) and Piroe (7) dropped into their own half.
In what was a deviation from their usual 4-1-3-2 pressing structure, Norwich pressed in a man-oriented 4-4-2 shape to ensure both Leeds pivots were occupied. Hernandez (25) and Rowe (27) were responsible for pressing the full-backs, while Idah (11) and Gibbs (8) were ready to press the centre-backs. The centre-backs were responsible for tracking a dropping forward.
But there were two key flaws with Norwich’s pressing structure. With Rodon (14) and Struijk (21) both occupied, Meslier (1) simply waited for one of Norwich’s front two to press before finding the free centre-back via a bounce pass from a pivot.
Given Norwich also focus on provoking opposition players to press before accessing the free man behind, they should have been wiser to this strategy by leaving Meslier (1) free or by ensuring a centre-back remained occupied even when a forward pressed.
The other flaw was between the second and third lines of Norwich’s press. With Piroe (7) or Rutter (24) occupying the space between the lines, one Norwich centre-back – often Gibson (6) – was forced to jump into midfield.
If he was late, the player between the lines was free; when he arrived on time, he left Duffy (24) with too much space to defend. Leeds often exploited this weakness with one forward dropping into the space behind the pressing Norwich winger.
In settled possession, Leeds’ often created a 2-3-5 shape as Kamara (8) moved into the left half space, leaving Ampadu (4) as a single pivot. This shape allowed the visitors to create wide triangles between the full-backs, Piroe (7) or Kamara (8), and the wingers.
With Norwich still setup in a 4-4-2 shape, Leeds were able to occupy space between the lines while creating 3v2 wide overloads. The full-backs occasionally overlapped, allowing the wingers to invert.
With half an hour remaining, Daniel Farke introduced Gnonto (29) and Bamford (9) to create a 3-5-2 formation. This change in shape meant Leeds had clear structural superiority, while Norwich’s press now lacked man-orientation.
In possession, the visitors created a 3-1-4-2 shape as Bamford (9) joined Rutter (24) in a front two. By moving James (20) to the left, Summerville (10) was free to invert alongside Piroe (7), while Gnonto (29) occupied the right wing.
These formation and personnel changes also improved Leeds’ pressing structure, which became a 3-3-2-2 with both Norwich pivots now occupied behind Bamford (9) and Rutter (24). By adding a player to the initial phases of their press, Leeds were able to disrupt Norwich’s deep build-up patterns more effectively.
Despite vast improvements to Norwich’s build-up patterns in the first half, Wagner’s side totally lost control of the second. As a result, their enduring weaknesses in defensive transitions were exposed once again. These weaknesses can be split into two: the structural aspect and the player profile aspect.
Norwich’s settled play structure, where the full-backs overlap and the wingers invert, leaves vast spaces for the centre-backs to defend if the counter-press fails. This issue is compounded by the profile of the centre-backs in question, neither of whom are particularly suited to defending large spaces behind.
The structure exposes the centre-backs, and the centre-backs expose the structure. It is a catch-22. Paradoxically, however, this catch-22 has two possible solutions. The first is to change the profiles of the centre-backs, which seems unlikely outside of a transfer window; the second is to fix the structure.
While Norwich’s build-up patterns were nothing short of exceptional in the first half, the problems they faced in the second half are becoming far too familiar; it is important to recognise that both of these assessments can be true at once.
But if David Wagner is to escape from the difficult position he finds himself in, he must find a way to improve Norwich’s security in defensive transitions. Simply ‘not making mistakes in possession’ is not a good enough solution; the structure should be there to mitigate mistakes.
The concern now is how much time fans are prepared to give Wagner. Norwich’s build-up patterns require patience and composure, two things that are unlikely to be facilitated by an increasingly impatient Carrow Road crowd.