Norwich Vs Hull

Tactics Matter

Score: 2 – 1

Possession (%): 57 – 43

Passes: 553 – 431

Shots: 28 – 9

xG: 2.73 – 0.39

• Midfield boxes and diamonds.

• Norwich’s tactical superiority in every phase.

• Hull’s disengaged pressing structure.

• Norwich’s intensity out of possession.

Base Formations:

David Wagner and Liam Rosenior’s sides were both set up in 4-4-2 base formations, although Norwich’s shape was much more fluid in possession. Norwich’s double pivot and front two were not restricted to one side and often swapped depending on the situation.

In their first build-up phase, Norwich created a 4-2-4 shape with a midfield box. Gibson and Duffy dropped alongside Gunn, behind a Sara and McLean double pivot. Stacey and Giannoulis stayed deep as alternative escape routes if central ball progression was not possible.

Ahead of Norwich’s double pivot, Barnes and Sargent stayed deep and occupied the half spaces. This created the midfield box ahead of Norwich’s back four. Hernandez and Rowe provided the width, with both Norwich wingers staying high on the left and right wings, respectively.

With Norwich playing out from the back, Delap and Tufan were the first line of pressure in the visitor’s 4-4-2 pressing structure. Hull’s front two were tasked with blocking passing lanes to the Norwich double pivot. This is known as cover shadowing.

Traore (10) and Vaughan (14) were responsible for pressing Norwich’s full backs should they be used for ball progression. Seri and Slater, Hull’s double pivot, occupied the space behind McLean and Sara. The visitors’ centre backs were responsible for jumping onto Sargent and Barnes if they were used as an out-ball.

But Hull’s pressing structure was deeply flawed, and Norwich’s shape was perfectly set up to exploit it. With Norwich’s centre backs either side of Gunn, Wagner’s men created a 3v2 against the first line of Hull’s press.

This ensured there were clear passing lanes to Norwich’s double pivot and meant Hull’s cover shadowing was totally ineffective. As a result, Norwich were able to bypass Tufan and Delap to progress centrally with ease.

With the first line of pressure bypassed, Hull’s double pivot should have jumped onto Sara and McLean to prevent further central ball progression. The centre backs would then have to jump onto Barnes and Sargent to prevent a 4v2 central overload.

But Seri (24) and Slater (27) were consistently too late to jump. Their failure to jump in time was likely due to Barnes and Sargent’s positioning. The Norwich front two dropped deep enough to engage Hull’s double pivot, preventing them from jumping onto Sara and McLean. This allowed Norwich to create a 4v2 numerical advantage in midfield.

The combination of Norwich’s clever set-up and Hull’s flawed pressing structure meant Wagner’s side had complete superiority in the deep build-up phases.

The hosts had a 3v2 numerical advantage against the first line of pressure and a 4v2 advantage in midfield. By pinning Hull’s full backs to prevent them from joining the press, Hernandez and Rowe ensured these advantages were not lost. These advantages meant Norwich could draw the press to create space between the lines, this space allowed for verticality in the build-up.

Not only did Norwich have tactical superiority in the deep build-up phases, but they also exploited Hull’s structure in settled play.

After Norwich’s initial build-up, Hull dropped into a flat 4-4-2 mid-block, while Wagner’s men transitioned into their 3-3-4 shape. McLean or Sara dropped to create a back three, Hernandez and Rowe inverted, and the full backs provided the width.

Barnes or Sargent often dropped deeper to create a 3-4-3 midfield diamond. This shape meant that even without Gunn, Norwich had a 3v2 overload against Hull’s front two and, as a result, Sara was easily accessible via the wide centre backs.

While Norwich no longer had a 4v2 numerical advantage in midfield, the angles created by the diamond structure meant they had positional superiority instead. With Hull totally disengaged and lacking man orientation, Norwich’s midfield four were all able to find space and receive passes between the lines.

Having had complete tactical superiority in every build-up phase, Norwich also had numerous advantages moving into the final third.

With one striker dropping deep, the remaining striker could exploit the space vacated by a centre back; this is known as dynamic superiority. The visitors’ full backs were caught in a 2v1 against Norwich’s inverted wingers and overlapping full backs; this is an example of numerical superiority.

With the front two staying narrow and the full backs occupying the wide corridors, Norwich were able to exploit the half spaces between Hull’s centre backs and full backs.

Aside from Norwich’s dominance in possession, their pressing structure was also impressive.

In the first phase of their build-up, Liam Rosenior’s Hull transitioned into a 4-2-4 shape, while David Wagner’s Norwich pressed in a 4-1-3-2 with Hernandez, Sara, and Rowe occupying the space just behind Barnes and Sargent. Kenny McLean sat in front of Norwich’s back four.

With Hull determined to play out from the back, Norwich looked to create transitions in dangerous areas. Wagner’s side tended to force Hull to play towards right back Lewis Coyle, before trapping them against the touchline to force turnovers when they did.

McLean’s role was crucial in this process. The Scottish international was tasked with either joining Sara to press the double pivot or with moving to whichever side Hull tried to play out from; this meant Norwich always had a ball-side numerical advantage.

Norwich’s aggressive press was far more effective than Hull’s, with the home side not only able to prevent the visitors from progressing through their double pivot, but also forcing them to abandon their deep build-up strategy.

Their only successful strategy was to play directly to their full backs before Norwich could shift towards the touchlines. Liam Delap was the only player who was able to hold the ball up successfully when Hull managed to escape the press.

In settled play, Hull transitioned into a 2-3-5 shape with both full backs moving into the half spaces. To allow for the occupation of the five attacking corridors, Regan Slater (27) moved into the right half space while Liam Delap (20) moved into the central corridor.

To maintain man orientation after the high pressing phases, Norwich created a 4-4-2 diamond with Sara staying tight to Hull’s single pivot and McLean preventing a 5v4 last-line overload.

Hull struggled to create advantages in possession, with Wagner’s men preventing overloads in the first line, in midfield, and in their last line.

When defending deep, Norwich dropped back into a flat 4-4-2 with Rowe and Hernandez tasked with helping their nearest full back to prevent last-line overloads.

Saturday’s season opener was a clear indicator of how far Norwich have come. At 1-0 down, there was no doubt that Norwich had been the better team; it often looked as though Wagner’s side had more players than the visitors. Therein lies the value of tactics. Norwich were able to create overloads in every phase of the game.

The intensity of Norwich’s performance was another significant factor; the squad is clearly the fittest it has been for a significant period. This, combined with the quality of the tactical processes within the game, are key signs that Norwich are moving in the right direction.

Many people watch football for moments – after all, moments decide games – but after moments of chaos, it is important to remember the processes that created them. Tactics matter.