Norwich Vs Cardiff

Norwich Vs Cardiff:

Score: 2 - 0

Possession (%): 65 - 35

xG: 1.72 - 0.63

· Cardiff blocking the central corridor and the Sara trap.

· Escaping the Sara trap.

· Cardiff's second half changes.

· How Norwich could improve.

Base Formations:

Norwich were in a 4-2-3-1 base formation, with Sørenson coming in for Giannoulis and Marquinhos replacing Dowell. Cardiff were set up in a 3-4-2-1. But due to their lack of possession, this most often became a 5-4-1.

During Norwich's build-up, Cardiff pressed with a central box structure. This was similar to a strategy used by Coventry in their eventful 4-2 defeat to Norwich in David Wagner's second league game in charge. Wintle (6), Sawyers (19), Philogene-Bidace (25) and Ralls (8) created this box, while Wickham (31) used his cover shadow to block simple passes to Sara.

The idea behind this strategy was to reduce the influence of Gabriel Sara, thereby preventing Norwich's dangerous central transitions. This press, known as 'space orientated zonal marking', is designed to control and deny access to space.

Cardiff's structure denied Norwich of central superiority, as Núñez and Sara's spaces were both filled by two Cardiff midfielders.

While Sara was often boxed in by Cardiff's pressing structure, the Bluebirds rarely applied pressure to Norwich's centre backs. As a result, Norwich were able to dominate possession and Sara was often found through diagonal passes from Gibson or Hanley. Cardiff were happy for Sara to receive these passes, but Wintle (6) and Sawyers (19) did not allow Sara time and space to turn and pass forward.

Typically, a box structure such as this would shift across to both touchlines in time with sideways passes. But Cardiff were careful not to concede space centrally. Instead of purely relying on a shift to trap Norwich’s full backs, Cardiff's wing backs would jump to apply pressure to Aarons and Sorenson.

Aside from lacking intensity and bravery, one fault within Cardiff's press was noticeable when Norwich were building-up near their corner flags. With Cardiff only pressing each side with two players, it was easy for Norwich to create numerical superiority and escape.

In order to reduce the significance of Cardiff's pressing structure, Norwich needed to transition without going through the central corridor. This meant exploiting the half spaces, often occupied by Hernandez and Marquinhos, and the wide zones which were filled by Aarons and Sorenson.

If one full back dropped to help Norwich's build-up, Núñez was free to move into the half space on that side when the winger moved into the wide zone.

Occasionally, when McLean dropped into a back three, Aarons inverted from right back to join Sara in midfield. This is a rotation David Wagner should look to use more often.

If Aarons was part of Norwich's front line, Núñez would drop to support Sara. These rotations provided horizontal passing options for Sara, without him needing to turn and pass forward.

By dropping into a 5-4-1, Cardiff were often able to prevent overloads from Norwich's attacking five in the final third. But McLean sometimes joined Norwich's front line to create a 6v5.

In the second half, Cardiff boss Sabri Lamouchi made three substitutions and changed their shape to a 5-3-2. The rationale behind this adjustment may have been to deny Norwich access to the half spaces and wide zones.

The second half saw Norwich continue to dominate the ball but struggle to break down Cardiff's low block.

There are still some tactical improvements which could be made by David Wagner. One inverting full back should become a more common occurrence for Norwich, especially against opponents looking to trap Sara when McLean drops into a back three. Against Cardiff, Núñez and Aarons occasionally provided Sara with support, but this should be happening more often.

Without such rotations, Norwich will dominate possession but struggle to break teams down. These rotations would also improve Norwich's rest defence and, therefore, their resistance to counter attacks. By supporting Sara, Norwich would create a 3-2 rest defence rather than the 3-1 shape we have seen in many games under Wagner. This 3-1 structure has left Norwich vulnerable to counters.

Ultimately, it was two moments of brilliance - from former Sao Paulo teammates Gabriel Sara and Marquinhos - which decided the game on Saturday afternoon. While Norwich are tactically far superior now - under David Wagner - than they were under Dean Smith, there are still improvements to be made.