Norwich Vs Blackpool

Norwich Vs Blackpool: Analysing the 22/23 season finale.

Score: 0 - 1

Possession (%): 64 - 36

xG: 1.99 - 0.85

· The tactics behind a promising Norwich start.

· Blackpool’s minor adjustment out of possession.

· Norwich’s problematic structure in possession.

· Tactical reflections, and what next?

Base Formations:

For the majority of Monday’s game, both sides were set up in 4-2-3-1 base formations. Although, in the opening fifteen minutes, Blackpool’s shape resembled more of a 4-3-3. With Tzolis and Hernandez both starting, two natural left wingers, it was generally the Greek who was forced to occupy the right wing.

Norwich built-up in their usual 2-4-1-3 shape in the first phase, while the visitors pressed in a 4-2-3-1 with former Wroxham and King’s Lynn midfielder Sonny Carey (16) pressing Norwich’s deepest pivot. This 4-2-3-1 often became a 4-1-4-1 when Patino (28) was forced to jump onto Norwich’s free pivot. When pressing from the edge of their half, in the second pressing phase, Blackpool dropped into a 4-5-1 shape.

The first fifteen minutes of Norwich’s season finale were characterised by near total control and sustained pressure. With Blackpool failing to force Norwich back, the hosts were able to dominate the ball on the edge of Blackpool’s half. In these situations, Liam Gibbs frequently dropped alongside Omabamidele to create a back three with Sara becoming the single pivot.

Initially, Blackpool’s passive and disengaged 4-5-1 pressing structure facilitated Norwich’s control and granted the hosts total structural superiority. With Norwich building up with a back three, Josh Bowler (11) and CJ Hamilton (22) often inverted to join Morgan Rogers (25) in the first line of pressure, thus creating a 4-3-3.

These inversions, combined with Blackpool’s lack of man-to-man engagement, left Sara unmarked and the half spaces free. The right half space was often occupied by Aarons or Tzolis inverting, while the left half space was either occupied by Nunez or Hernandez. Together, these rotations created a 3-3-4 structure in possession: a promising structural development for Wagner’s men.

But Norwich’s encouraging start was interrupted as Josh Bowler’s (11) pass to Morgan Rogers (25), exploiting some poor defensive positioning from Sorenson, saw the visitors take the lead.

Shortly after their goal, Blackpool made a minor adjustment to their deep pressing structure. Rather than transitioning into a 4-5-1/4-3-3, the visitors stayed in their 4-2-3-1 shape as Carey (16) remained in a number ten role behind Morgan Rogers (25). Fiorini (8) and Patino (28) were also quicker to press players moving into the half spaces.

This adjustment reduced the time and space Sara had as a single pivot and severely limited Norwich’s initial routes of ball progression into the half spaces.

As the game progressed, and Norwich became increasingly desperate for a goal, the 3-1-1-5 shape of previous weeks began to reappear. This shape provides good occupation of space horizontally, with the wide players creating maximum width and a 5v4 against the back line, but it fails to create offensive depth and, as a result, makes Norwich far too easy to defend against.

After having structural and positional superiority in the opening fifteen minutes, Norwich failed to adapt to Blackpool’s improved pressing structure. Sara was now occupied by Carey (16), and the half spaces were blocked by Patino (28) and Fiorini (8).

Alternatively, Nunez could have dropped alongside Sara to create a 2v1 against Carey (16), while Tzolis, Hernandez, and Pukki could have created a 3v2 against Patino (28) and Fiorini (8).

In the second half, with McCallum replacing Giannoulis, Norwich occasionally created a similar structure. McCallum would drop into a back three, allowing Gibbs to join Sara in midfield, creating the 2v1 against Carey (16). This is a structure Norwich should have created more often.

Typically, David Wagner’s Norwich press in a 4-1-3-2 shape, but against Blackpool the hosts pressed in a man-orientated 4-1-4-1 structure. Tzolis and Hernandez were responsible for pressing the full backs, while Sara and Nunez stayed tight to Patino (28) and Fiorini (8), respectively. In the second pressing phase, Norwich dropped back into a 4-4-1-1 shape.

But it was in defensive transitions when Norwich were most vulnerable. Wagner’s men often fail to compensate for their attacking full backs. With Gibbs dropping into a back three, Sara is left as a lone midfielder ahead of a flat line of three. Not only does this limit routes of central ball progression, but after a turnover, it means an opponent is only one pass away from being through on goal.

For much of the second half, in pursuit of a perfect end to Pukki’s Norwich City story, Wagner’s men totally lost their structure. But before the desperation for a Pukki goal set in, Norwich’s structural issues were clear.

In a sport where players’ positions are determined by a variety of reference points – whether it be space, zones, teammates, opponents, or the ball – connections between players are crucial.

Proximity is key to these connections; the greater the distances between players, the greater the disconnect. With disconnection comes risk: a risk of turnovers in possession and vulnerability in transitions. Conceding space grants an opponent the opportunity to form connections where you have failed to.

As the curtain closes on a disappointing season, it is clear that Norwich will need to recruit well, and ahead of next season, they need to find a structure within which new personnel can flourish.