Different Approach, Same Result
Score: 1 – 3
Possession (%): 56 – 44
Passes: 505 – 413
Shots: 21 – 10
xG: 1.33 – 1.36
• Blackburn’s unique build-up.
• A fundamentally flawed Norwich press.
• Blackburn’s aggressive man-to-man press.
• Are tactics the problem?
Base Formations:
David Wagner made four changes following his side’s dismal defeat away at Sunderland, with Jaden Warner coming in to make his league debut.
Blackburn boss Jon Dahl Tomasson made two changes as Adam Wharton and Andrew Moran came into the visitor’s eleven.
On paper, both sides lined up in 4-2-3-1 base formations, but in practice, it was rare to see such setups.
The visitors transitioned into a unique deep build-up structure, with various rotations totally changing the nature of their formation. Rovers’ goalkeeper Leopold Wahlstedt (12) joined Hill (4), Scott Wharton (16), and Pickering (3) in a situational back four.
Moran (24) joined Adam Wharton (23) and Tronstad (6) in a deep midfield three, while right-back Rankin-Costello (11) joined Szmodics (8) in an attacking midfield position. Dolan (10) often moved out to the left wing, and Brittain (2) stayed wide on the right.
Norwich’s response to these rotations was to create a fundamentally flawed press.
Nunez (26) and Hwang (31) created the front two. McLean (23) and Sara (17) occupied Adam Wharton (23) and Tronstad (6) – who were, on paper, Blackburn’s double pivot – while Rowe (27) was ready to press Pickering (3) and Hernandez (25) man-marked Rankin-Costello (11).
This strategy completely failed to consider Rovers’ build-up rotations and, as a result, created a total mess of a pressing structure.
On the left, Nunez (26) pressed Wahlstedt (12) – leaving Hill (4) free – while Hernandez (25) was pinned back by Rankin-Costello (11). On the right, Rowe (27) left Moran (24) unoccupied when pressing Pickering (3).
But Norwich’s pressing flaws were not merely limited to the first and second lines of pressure; instead, their initial failings created a domino effect.
With Moran (24) theoretically starting as a right winger, it was Stacey’s (3) responsibility to close him down. However, by joining a deep midfield three, Moran (24) was a significant distance from Stacey’s (3) starting position.
As a result, when Rowe (27) joined the first line, Stacey (3) was often caught between Moran (24) and Dolan (10), forcing Warner (50) to move to the right.
Sammie Szmodics (8) – who went on to score two goals – was given the freedom of NR1 between the lines, with Duffy (24) initially occupying space in another postcode.
The Irish international was frequently late to jump onto Szmodics (8). Once he did jump, he often missed the ball and left huge spaces behind for Blackburn’s attacking four; this is an example of a tactical flaw forcing an individual mistake.
To understand just how naive Norwich’s press was, we can set their structure against Blackburn’s base formation (their setup before rotations) to reveal the flawed logic behind the strategy.
Against the visitor’s 4-2-3-1 base formation, Norwich would have created a man-to-man 4-4-2 press.
Theoretically, this would have been an acceptable, albeit high-risk, strategy. But the theory was wrong; it failed to consider Blackburn’s positional rotations.
When you analyse Norwich’s pressing strategy against Blackburn’s actual build-up structure, the myriad of interconnected errors become clear.
In the build-up to Blackburn’s second goal, these errors were exploited in a different way. Following a failed Norwich counter-attack, Rankin-Costello (11) – followed by his marker Onel Hernandez (25) – was drawn into a right-back position.
With Hwang (31), Nunez (26), and Rowe (27) in the first line, and McLean (23) too deep to press, Hill (4) was free behind the first line of pressure. Having moved infield to track Moran (24), this time Stacey (3) left Szmodics (8) free, while Duffy (24) attempted to jump onto Dolan (10).
These poorly executed jumps represented last-ditch attempts to rectify the mistakes created by Norwich's flawed press, but they left Warner (50) with far too much space to defend against Szmodics (8).
Norwich’s poor pressing strategy continued beyond their high pressing phases. In the build-up to Blackburn’s opener, after just seven minutes, the flaws within Norwich’s 4-4-2 mid-block were obvious.
In settled possession, Blackburn transitioned into a 3-2-4-1 shape as Pickering (3) became a hybrid left centre-back in a situational back three. Moran (24) and Rankin-Costello (11) or Brittain (2) provided the width, with the wide players hugging the touchlines to stretch the Norwich backline.
With many Norwich players caught between two opponents, Blackburn were easily able to access Dolan (10) or Szmodics (8) via the wide players.
In the build-up to the first goal, for example, it took Blackburn just three passes to play from Scott Wharton (16) to Dolan (10), who easily bypassed Duffy (24) leaving the Rovers’ forward in a 1v1 against Long (12). It was a pattern that took just nine seconds from start to finish.
In possession, the hosts created their usual 4-2-4 deep build-up shape, while Jon Dahl Tomasson’s Blackburn initially pressed in an aggressive man-to-man system.
Norwich’s primary build-up strategy was to go long, aiming for Rowe (27) and Hernandez (25) in the space behind the visitor’s centre-backs. But the hosts frequently failed to win first and second balls, rendering this strategy totally ineffective.
Once Blackburn were 2-0 up, their press became less aggressive as only one centre-back jumped into midfield, giving the visitors a 3v2 in the last line.
But Norwich continued to play long into an area of numerical inferiority, with Wagner’s men failing to adapt to the change in game state as Blackburn had done.
Instead, Norwich should have targeted the 2v1 numerical advantage created by their double false nine.
Blackburn made it very difficult for Norwich to generate chances from periods of settled possession, with the visitor’s wingers dropping alongside the full-backs to prevent a last-line overload.
This strategy became even more noticeable after Scott Wharton’s red card, when the challenge for Norwich became about breaking down a low-block – a challenge they also failed.
There were clear differences between David Wagner’s tactical approaches against Blackburn and Sunderland. On Wearside, Wagner opted for a passive approach out of possession; against Blackburn, he switched back to a more aggressive press.
Both approaches failed miserably, and the outcome remained exactly the same – not just in the result but in the scoreline too.
There have been a variety of attributions given for Norwich’s current form: is it a player issue, is it a coaching issue, or is it a deeper issue? The polarising nature of contemporary discourse leaves little room for compromise. But it is in compromise that the truth can be found.
It is true that players are making mistakes, but those mistakes are symptoms of fundamental tactical flaws. While some mistakes cannot be mitigated, tactics should provide a structure within which players can excel. David Wagner’s recent tactical setups have failed to meet that criteria, and the players’ profiles fail to meet his.
But all of that is symptomatic of deeper issues. It should never have got to this point.